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Effective Legal Reform and the Malpractice Insurance
Crisis
Richard E. Anderson, M.D.*
This Case Study is built around two fundamental questions: First, is
there really a malpractice insurance crisis in the United States today?
Second, what is the best way to improve the medical liability system? While
there is much ongoing debate, this Case Study argues that the answers to
both questions are clear. I first review the nature, breadth, and source of
the current crisis and then examine ways to ameliorate the problems in
both the short and long-term. There is clear evidence that current
problems are the result of a dramatic increase in the cost of litigation and
that certain legal reforms would significantly alleviate the crisis.
I. THE MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS
A crisis is defined as "an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in
which a decisive change is impending; especially one with the distinct
possibility of a highly undesirable outcome."' The American Medical
Association (AMA) has found this definition to be an apt description of the
medical malpractice insurance situation in an increasing number of U.S.
states:
America's patients are losing access to care because the nation's out-of-
control legal system is forcing physicians in some areas of the country to
retire early, relocate or give up performing high-risk medical procedures.
There are now 20 states in a full-blown medical liability crisis-up from
12 in 2002. In crisis states, patients continue to lose access to care. In
some states, obstetricians and rural family physicians no longer deliver
babies. Meanwhile, high-risk specialists no longer provide trauma care or
perform complicated surgical procedures.
* Fellow of the American College of Physicians, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of The Doctors Company.
1. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 275 (10th ed. 1995).
2. Am. Med. Ass'n, America's Medical Liability Crisis: A National View (2004), at
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The actions of protesting doctors-from selectively withholding
medical services to marching on state capitols to demand legal reform-
have also made it clear that we are in the midst of a crisis.3 In turn,
multiple state legislatures,4 the United States Congress,5 and the media
have turned their attention to medical malpractice, frequently concluding
that increasing insurance rates represent an urgent concern that must be
addressed. Important legislative action has been taken in states as diverse
as Texas, Florida, and Idaho.' Many other states are actively debating the
issue, but no legislation has resulted.8 The fact that so many legislatures are
simultaneously and independently discussing the malpractice insurance
crisis attests to its urgency.
The current state of medical malpractice insurance has been
precipitated by a sharp rise in the cost of malpractice claims-both due to
the increasing volume of malpractice litigation and to the growing size of
awards. This increase in the cost of claims has resulted in a dramatic rise in
the cost of malpractice premiums. In 2002, malpractice insurance rates for
physicians nationwide rose approximately twenty percent,9 but this average
figure obscures a very wide range. States like California that enjoy effective
legal reforms have seen rates increase only a few percent per year in this
interval,'0 while states lacking such reforms have seen increases in excess of
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11871 .html.
3. Tom Ramstack, Doctors' Careers on Life Support, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2003 at Al.
4. AM. TORT REFORM Ass'N, TORT REFORM REcoRD 2-3 (July 2004), http://www.atra.org
/files.cgi/7802_Record6-04.pdf
5. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH) Act of 2004,
H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. (2004); Pregnancy and Trauma Care Access Protection Act of 2004,
S. 2207, 108th Cong. (2004).
6. See, e.g., Jessica Bruder, New Jersey Starts Fund for Malpractice Costs, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2004, at B5. Research searches using the phrase "malpractice crisis" return a multitude of
articles, reports, and other resources. See, e.g., U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM
RATES (June 2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03702.pdf; John E. Lemoine,
Controlling the Medical Malpractice Crisis: A Letter from the CEO (Jan. 7, 2004), at
http://www.lammico.com/letter/addendum-detail.asp?addendum=17; Casualty Actuarial
Soc'y, The Medical Malpractice Crises: The Causes and Remedy, at
http://www.casact.org/media/medmal.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
7. See AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, supra note 4, at 2-3.
8. See id.
9. 2002 Rate Survey Finds Malpractice Premiums Are Soaring..., MED. LIABILITY MONITOR,
Oct. 2002, at I-IV.
10. In fact, since 1976, when the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of
1975, chs. 1-2, 1975 Cal. Stat. 2d Ex. Sess. 3949, went into effect, California's rates have
V:l1 (2005)
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one hundred percent for specialists in high-risk areas of medicine." As a
result, high-risk physicians in states lacking legal reforms face annual
malpractice insurance premiums in excess of $100,000 and in some cases
in excess of $200,000 per year, per doctor. 2 In the states most directly
affected by rising premiums-for example, Mississippi, West Virginia,
Nevada, and Pennsylvania-some physicians have found themselves
uninsurable at any price or have turned to state-run plans, which are even
more expensive than coverage available in the marketplace, as the insurer
of last resort.
3
A. The Underlying Problem: Malpractice Litigation
1. Frequency of Litigation
Even the now commonplace phrase "high-risk specialists" is indicative
of this crisis. We used to speak of high-risk patients, referring to individuals
with higher than normal risk of unfavorable outcomes, such as
neurosurgical patients with spinal cord tumors. Now, we refer to entire
medical specialties as high-risk, meaning that they face a much higher than
normal risk of litigation. In fact, neurosurgeons practicing in the United
States today face, on average, a malpractice claim every two years. 14 For
obstetricians, orthopedists, general surgeons, emergency room doctors,
and other high-risk specialists, the figure is one claim every three years.
5
More than three quarters of all such claims close without any payment
to the plaintiff, but they are extremely costly to defend, averaging nearly
$23,000 per claim."6 If a case must go all the way through ajury trial before
increased by less than three percent per year. See RICHARD E. ANDERSON, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: A PHYSICIAN'S SOURCEBOOK 214 (2004); see also infra notes 40-53 and
accompanying text (discussing MICRA).
11. Trends in 2002 Rates for Physicians' Medical Professional Liability Insurance, MED.
LIABILITY MONITOR, Oct. 2002 (special report), at 1-16.
12. E.g., id. at 4.
13. NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, ADDRESSING THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
CRISIS 3-4 (2002).
14. Richard E. Anderson, Defending the Practice of Medicine, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1173,1174 (2004).
15. Id.
16. Harming Patient Access to Care: Implications of Excessive Litigation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 84 (2002)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Richard E. Anderson, M.D., F.A.C.P., Chairman/CEO
of The Doctors Co., for the Physician Insurers Ass'n of Am.).
3
Anderson: Effective Legal Reform and the Malpractice Insurance Crisis
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
a defense verdict, the average expense exceeds $85,000.7 These costly
victories are important drivers of medical malpractice premium rates.
There are more than 125,000 pending malpractice claims against
America's 700,000 licensed physicians today."' Thus, if you are reading this
Case Study on a weekday, roughly six hundred more malpractice claims
will be filed today. This large number of claims is even more striking when
you consider that many licensed physicians are in research, academia, the
military, or are retired and are thus not at risk of being sued.
2. Fallacy of the Bad Doctor
Faced with this onslaught of litigation, physicians feel that they are
under siege.' 9 There might be less widespread concern about malpractice
claims if they were primarily brought against negligent doctors. The
frequency data cited above make clear that virtually all physicians face the
prospect of litigation, though most are ultimately vindicated. There is little
victory in vindication, however, given the costs, long duration of
malpractice claims,20 and the personal attacks on professional identity that
are at the core of the malpractice allegations.
In any given year, two percent of claims are responsible for about half
of the compensation provided to plaintiffs, 2' leading some to argue that
removing the two percent of doctors responsible for these large claims
would eliminate the crisis. However, the two percent of physicians who
have to make these payments differ every year. Were this fact not true,
other doctors would not risk practicing with them, nor tolerate their
negative impact on the profession, and insurance companies certainly
would not offer them coverage. In truth, the problem with our current
medical liability system is not the presence of a few bad doctors, it is that
17. Id. at 86.
18. See Health Care Liab. Alliance, Health Care Lawsuits, Claim Payments on Upswing
(Apr. 27, 1995) (on file with author). The 125,000 figure is based on data from 1995
because the number of pending claims has not been tracked since then. The figure of
125,000 represents a conservative estimate of current suits, since the number of physicians
practicing has increased significantly, WAYS AND MEANS COMM., HOUSE OF REPS., GREEN BOOK
2003 app. C, C27-28 (2003), and the frequency of litigation has certainly not decreased
significantly since 1995, The Doctors Co., Annual Claims Per Mature Internal Medical
Equivalent Doctor 1976-2002 (on file with author).
19. SeeANDERSON, supra note 10, at ix-xv.
20. On average, "it takes 5 'A years for an insurer to close a malpractice claim after the
date of the incident." Hearing, supra note 16, at 87.
21. See ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 210.
V: 1 (2005)
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every year a large number of physicians face meritless claims.22
Why are the doctors involved in large claims different every year? The
Harvard Medical Practice Study gives us the answer: There is no
relationship between the presence or absence of medical negligence and
the outcome of malpractice litigation. The only variable that predicts the
outcome of claims is the degree of injury. A severely injured plaintiff is
likely to be compensated in court whether or not the doctor was at fault.
23
3. Increasing Size of Claim Awards
While the volume of malpractice litigation alone is sufficient to qualify
as a crisis, the cost of the average claim is rising at unprecedented rates.
Between 1997 and 2000, the median malpractice award doubled to one
million dollars.24 The average (modal) jury verdict in malpractice trials was
3.5 million dollars in 2000.25 In states without legal reforms, the outer limit
of liability has skyrocketed to amounts never before seen in medical
negligence cases. 26 Just under one billion dollars in medical malpractice
compensation was paid out in New York and Pennsylvania (combined) in
2000,7 and the total cost of medical malpractice litigation now exceeds
281twenty-four billion dollars annually and continues to grow.
22. Steve Ellman, ABA Blasts Fla. Ballot Measure Limiting Attorney Fees, MIAMI DAILY Bus.
REv. (Oct. 18, 2004); see also Medical Malpractice Lawyers, Medical Malpractice Lawsuit, at
http://www.medmalattorney.us.com/lawsuit.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2004). While the
costs incurred by the medical profession are widespread, few injured patients benefit from
the payments. It is worth noting that contingency fee lawyers take home up to forty percent
of the awards won by plaintiffs.
23. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes
of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1963-67 (1996) (comparing
outcomes based on independent assessments of the merit of plaintiffs' claims).
24. Press Release, Jury Verdict Research, Medical Malpractice Verdict and Settlement
Study Released (Mar. 22, 2002) (on file with author).
25. Jury Verdict Research, Ins. Info. Inst., Trends in Malpractice Insurance: Behind the
Chaos (on file with author).
26. A jury in Texas awarded a $268 million verdict in a case involving the death of a
single patient. Model's Jury Award Top Verdict, LAWYERS WEEKLY USA, Jan. 8, 2001, at 1.
Pennsylvania has had multiple awards in excess of $50 million. Christopher Guadagnino,
Malpractice Awards Surge in PA, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIG.,Jan. 2001, http://www.physiciansnews
.com/cover/10l.html.
27. PA. MED. Soc'Y, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SEVERrny, 2000 (2002).
28. TILLINGHAST-TOwERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2003 UPDATE 13 (2003).
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B. Impact on Malpractice Insurance Companies
The rising cost of claims has meant that malpractice insurers will have
paid close to $1.60 for every dollar of premium collected between 2001
and 2003.29 The cost of claims represents nearly eighty percent of an
insurer's expenses and the nonpartisan United States General
Accounting Office (GAO) affirms that "losses on medical malpractice
claims appear to be the primary driver of increased premium rates in the
long term. Such losses are by far the largest component of insurer costs,




At the same time, falling interest rates between 2000 and 2002 lowered
investment returns on premiums and reserves, reducing the subsidization
of rates. The decline in investment income, however, accounted for only
7.2% of premium increases according to the GAO, underscoring the
magnitude of rising claims costs. 32 Moreover, even in a better economic
environment, investment income can only be expected, at best, to bridge a
small gap between insurance rates and expenses.
II. SOLUTIONS TO THE CRISIS
Some of the factors that have produced this litigation crisis are cultural
and can be changed only over long periods of time. One of these is
monetary desensitization: From awards on games shows3 and the salaries
of sports figures" and corporate executives to attorneys' fees36 and the
29. See CONNING RESEARCH & CONSULTING INC., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: ANATOMY OF A
CRISIS 2003, at 22 (2003); see also JAMES D. HURLEY, A NEW CRISIS FOR THE MED MAL MARKET?,
4 EMPHASIS (Tillinghast) 2 (2002), http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/
publications/emphasis/Emphasis 2002_4/Hurley.pdf. This statistic reflects all medical
malpractice insurers, including physician-owned medical practice insurers (termed mutuals
and reciprocals). These insurers cover more than sixty percent of the country's doctors, see
Hearing, supra note 14, at 86, and do not face shareholder pressure for profit.
30. U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 6, at 16.
31. Id. at 43.
32. Id. at 27.
33. For example, Who Wants To Be a Millionaire? has replaced the $64,000 Question.
34. The shortstop for a last place team signed a ten-year $252 million contract. See
Murray Chass, Rodriguez Strikes It Rich in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at DI.
35. In recent years, we have seen billionaires created after two or three years of hard
work in the technology industry. MicroSolutions and Broadcast.com founder, Mark Cuban,
and eBay founder, Pierre Omidyar, are just two examples. The Forbes 400, The Richest People
in America, FORBES, Oct. 11, 2004 (Special Issue), at 186, 254.
V:l1 (2005)
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federal budget, we have seen dramatic increases in the amounts of money
at stake in society. Hearing about people earning hundreds of millions of
dollars or deals totaling billions of dollars is now surprisingly
commonplace. In this environment, it is not surprising that a jury that
would have awarded one million dollars a few years ago now responds with
a ten million dollar verdict, even though actual economic damages in
medical malpractice claims have not changed to nearly that extent. This
monetary desensitization, in general, and the size of jury verdicts, in
particular, has greatly exceeded the inflation rate for the economy as a
whole. 8 More broadly, Phillip Howard, founder of the legal reform group
Common Good, notes:
Fear of litigation has undermined our freedom to make sensible
decisions. Doctors, teachers, ministers, even little league coaches, find
their daily decisions hampered by legal fear. Our system of justice, long
America's greatest pride, is now considered a tool for extortion, not
balance. What's missing is the essential idea of law. Law is supposed to set
the boundaries of legal action, so that people know where they stand.
Law should make us feel comfortable doing what's reasonable and
nervous doing what's wrong. Today Americans are nervous doing almost
anything.9
Changing this mindset will be difficult and will take a considerable
amount of time to happen. Fortunately, we do not have to wait for such a
cultural shift to occur on its own; there are several strategies available that
will help create meaningful change in the short-term.
A. MICRA and Effective Tort Reform
There is more than a quarter century of experience and an abundance
of evidence that the four principal reforms embodied in California's
36. Attorneys regularly now demand billion dollar fees in areas such as tobacco,
asbestos, and other mass tort litigation. See, e.g., CrR. FOR LEGAL POL'Y AT THE MANHATTAN
INST., TRIAL LAWYERS, INC.: A REPORT ON THE LAWSUIT INDUSTRY IN AMERICA 2003, at 6-7, 10-11
(2003); Lester Brickman, Want To Be a Billionaire? Sue a Tobacco Company, at
http://www.calahouston.org/billion.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
37. The federal budget is now expressed in trillions of dollars.
38. The average annual inflation rate in the United States between 1990 and 2000 was
2.7%. See North America: Economy: Inflation, at http://www.nationmaster.com/graph-
T/eco inf 199/NAM (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
39. Why We Have Come Together, Common Good, http://cgood.org/about (last visited
July 9, 2004).
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Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) statutes prevent the
kind of malpractice insurance crisis we are experiencing today.4
MICRA was passed by the California legislature in 1975 under
circumstances similar to those described in current headlines. A tidal wave
of malpractice litigation in the state drove up insurance rates by several
hundred percent, but eventually most insurers in California concluded
that the practice of medicine was not an insurable risk and simply refused
to provide coverage under any circumstances. 4' Local doctors went on
strike, and physicians marched on Sacramento. The legislature responded
with MICRA, and California has had a stable insurance environment ever
since.
There are four major components to MICRA: First, it provides for a
$250,000 cap on non-economic damages. This provision is the single most
important provision of MICRA. It is critical to note that there is no limit on
total awards for actual damages, but capping awards for pain and suffering
removes the potential for medical malpractice plaintiffs to be awarded
incalculable windfalls. Second, MICRA allows defendants to introduce into
evidence additional sources of compensation for injury that have already
been paid; this is known as collateral source reform.43 For example, if an
injured patient has already had lost wages or medical costs covered by
disability or medical insurance, the recovery need not be duplicated.
Third, MICRA provides for periodic payments, allowing damage awards to
be paid over the time frame they are intended to cover.44 This sensible
reform permits the insurance system to pay large awards without facing
insolvency by taking advantage of the time value of money and assures
funds will be available for the patient when needed. Finally, MICRA limits
contingency fees by using a sliding scale. 5 For example, an attorney may
keep forty percent of the first $50,000 of an award, but is limited to
$221,000 (plus expenses) of a one million dollar judgment, meaning an
additional $179,000 actually reaches the injured patient as compared to a
state with a straight forty percent contingency fee. Not only is this provision
of direct benefit to the injured patient, but it also makes it more difficult
40. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of 1975, chs. 1-2, 1975 Cal. Stat.
2d Ex. Sess. 3949.
41. Approximately eighty percent of the malpractice claims filed in California during
the twentieth century (up to 1975) were filed between 1970 and 1975. Barry Keene,
California's Medical Malpractice Crisis, HEALTH CARE LIABILITYALLIANCE 1 (2003).
42. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. §3333.2 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004).
43. Id. § 3333.1.
44. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 667.7 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004).
45. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 6146 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004).
V:1 (2005)
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for attorneys to finance large numbers of non-meritorious cases with the
few that they win. 6
MICRA has reduced California's malpractice premiums by forty
percent in constant dollars since 1975. Uncorrected for inflation, this
statistic translates into increases in insurance premiums of less than three
percent per year,47 less than one-third the rate at which premiums have
risen nationally.
48
It is reliably estimated by entities as diverse as the U.S. Congressional
Budget Office,49 the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, °
Milliman and Robertson,51 the Florida Governor's Select Task Force on
Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance,2 and the American Academy
of Actuaries 3 that passage of reforms similar to MICRA in states currently
lacking such statutes would result in premium savings of twenty-five to
thirty percent annually.
Not only is there convincing evidence that these reforms are effective
when enacted, we have, unfortunately, compelling evidence of the damage
that occurs when these reforms are withdrawn. The state of Ohio enacted
MICRA-like statutes in 1975. 4 Malpractice insurance rates in the state fell
steadily from 1975 until the law was challenged in 1982, and the Ohio
Supreme Court found the statutes to be unconstitutional.55 Thereafter,
malpractice insurance rates resumed their climb.56 Not surprisingly, Ohio is
46. More than three quarters of claims close without payment. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
47. ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 214.
48. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE
CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL
LIABILITY SYSTEM 19 (July 2002).
49. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE FOR H.R. 4600 HEALTH ACT OF 2002, at 1
(Sept. 25, 2002) (ordered reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce).
50. Supra note 48, at 18.
51. R.S. BIONDI & K QUINTILIAN, MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON, MEDICAL LIABILITY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY PROJECTED EFFECT ON NEW YORK PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY COSTS OF
CAPPING NONECONOMIC DAMAGES 2-4 (1995).
52. UNIv. OF CENTRAL FLA. GOVERNOR'S SELECT TASK FORCE ON HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE (2003) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE].
53. AM. AcAD. OF ACTUARIES, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TORT REFORM: LESSONS FROM THE
STATES 1-4 (Issue Brief, Fall 1996).
54. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Anderson 1994) (repealed 1997).
55. See Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991).
56. Medical Malpractice Reform in California, Ohio and New York, CONTINGENCIES (Am.
Acad. of Actuaries), Sept./Oct. 1995, at 22.
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one of the states the AMA has declared to be in "crisis" and is again
debating the need for legal reforms.
Similarly, Oregon capped non-economic damages in 1987. 57 In 1998,
the Oregon Supreme Court nullified the law. 5 By 2001, the cost of
malpractice claims in the state had increased from a base $15 million in
591998 to $60 million, an increase of 400%, and has continued to rise since.
Moreover, just as the California experience has illustrated the
effectiveness of MICRA, the experiences of other states have shown us how
much less effective other types of reforms have been. For example, New
York, Texas, and Florida have all at various times passed more limited
reform measures that predictably did not affect the malpractice crisis."° In
every case, legal reform opponents were able to substitute these measures
for MICRA-based statutes knowing that they would be less effective. Those
who would block necessary modification in the law will argue that tort
61reform sometimes fails to reduce malpractice premiums. Invariably, these
critics cite the experiences of states that have passed peripheral or minor
reforms rather than the fundamental protections embodied in MICRA. In
1996, Texas passed a package of reforms that included none of the MICRA
provisions and, as could have been easily predicted, resulted in no change
in malpractice insurance rates. This failure merely proves that minor
reforms will often prove ineffective. In 2003, the state passed a $250,000
limit on non-economic damages, and premium rates have already
stabilized and started to head downward .
57. OR. REv. STAT. § 31.710 (2003); see also Press Release, Am. Med. Ass'n, AMA Joins
Oregon Doctors To Protect Patient Access to Care (Aug. 10, 2004), http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/13939.html.
58. Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1997).
59. James T. Dorigan, Jr., Northwest Physicians Mutual Ins. Co., Oregon Medical
Malpractice 1996-2001, Presentation to Lane County Medical Society (Sept. 10, 2002) (on
file with author).
60. See ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 215; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4) (b) (Harrison
1996 & Supp. 2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(a), 3021-a, 5031 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2004);
TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.011, 33.015, 41.008 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004-
2005); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590, §§ 10.01, 14.01 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004-
2005).
61. Medical Malpractice Reform in California, Ohio and New York, supra note 56, at 23.








America's physicians face an unprecedented tide of litigation.63 The
direct costs of this crisis exceed twenty-four billion dollars per year, but the
indirect costs are much higher: The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services conservatively estimates that the cost of defensive
medicine may approach $100 billion per year." The Pew Charitable Trusts
project on medical liability in Pennsylvania reported that nearly forty
percent of the doctors surveyed were dissatisfied with the practice of
medicine.' These doctors are more likely to engage in "riskier prescribing
practices ... to leave clinical practice or relocate, disrupting continuity of
care. ""6 In particular, "[p]hysicians dissatisfied with liability risks and costs
may also take specific steps to reduce their exposure, such as restricting
scope of practice, avoiding high-risk patients, and engaging in 'defensive
medicine.' 67 More than ninety percent of specialists said that "the
malpractice system limits doctors' ability to provide the highest-quality
medical care.",,
Our medical system has been described as being on the verge of
"meltdown, 63 the AMA has declared that twenty states face medical liability
crisis,70 and physicians have started to talk about a coming "medical
apocalypse." 71 In many cases, legal standards of care have replaced medical
72
standards, and the practice of defensive medicine has become the norm.
The most serious and immediate effect of the malpractice crisis is its
impact on access to care. The Florida Governor's Select Task Force on
Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance concluded:
The concern over litigation and the cost and lack of medical malpractice
insurance have caused doctors to discontinue high-risk procedures, turn
away high-risk patients, close practices, and move out of the state. In
63. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
64. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 48, at 7.
65. Michelle M. Mello et al., Caring for Patients in a Malpractice Crisis: Physician Satisfaction
and Quality of Care, 23 HEALTI AFF. 42,45 (2004).
66. Id. at 43.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 49.
69. Earl R. Washburn, The Coming Medical Apocalypse, PHYSIcIAN ExEc., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at
34, 36.
70. See Am. Med. Ass'n, supra note 2.
71. See Washburn, supra note 69, at 34.
72. SeeAnderson, supra note 14, at 1177.
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some communities, doctors have ceased or discontinued delivering
73babies and discontinued hospital care.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality found that in 2000 the number of
physicians per capita was twelve percent higher in states with caps on non-
economic damages than in states lacking these reforms.74 The General
Accounting Office has found localized health care access problems in five
states experiencing rapid increases in malpractice insurance premiums,75
and there are innumerable specific instances of this effect.
76
In sharp contradistinction, analysis of the effect of MICRA on health
care access in California found that the enactment of MICRA was
important to ensuring that high-cost and low-income groups have access to
health care.77 Moreover, MICRA played an important role in lowering thecostof halthcarein •78
cost of health care in California. Finally, the resulting reduction in
"malpractice pressure" is expected to result in a greater number of
physicians practicing in the state.79
For more than twenty-five years, the nation has accumulated direct
experience with the effect of tort reform on medical malpractice insurance
premiums and access to health care. The four major reforms embodied in
MICRA, including, most importantly, a $250,000 limitation on non-
economic damages, promote a stable insurance market, preserve access to
care, and still provide full compensation for actual damages. We also know
that lesser reforms are ineffective and divert attention from the necessary
enactment of substantive legislation needed to effect real change.
Once this tort hemorrhaging has been stanched, we need to look
ahead to more profound reform. Phillip Howard has proposed specialized
73. See GOVERNOR'S TASKFORCE, supra note 52, at vi.
74. FREDJ. H. & WILLIAM E., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE IMPACT OF
STATE LAWS LIMITING MALPRACTICE AWARDS ON THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS
1 (July 2003).
75. U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING
PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE (Aug. 2003). Examples of typical local health care
access issues include decreased availability of Pap smears, reluctance to test HIV vaccines,
and the absence of even a single neurosurgeon in large areas of West Virginia.
76. HEALTH CARE LIAB. ALLIANCE, FACT SHEET: THE HEALTH CARE LIABILITY SYSTEM BARS
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE (1997) (on file with author).
77. WILLIAM G. HAMM, LECG, AN ANALYSIS OF HARVEY ROSENFIELD'S REPORT:
"CALIFORNIA'S MICRA" 12 (1997).
78. Id. at 18.
79. Id. at 23.
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health courts, staffed by specially trained judges with the power to hire
neutral experts.80 The goal would be to advance patient safety and increase
the reliability and predictability of legal rulings on the provision of health
care. Though such a proposal seems a long way from today's "shame and
blame" courts, similar systems are already in place for such specialized
areas as taxes, worker's compensation, and vaccine liability.8 There can be
little doubt that our flawed system of medical liability is in crisis. Solutions
that will provide immediate relief are available, and more profound long-
term change is also needed. The alternative is simply unacceptable.
80. Philip K. Howard, Op-Ed, A Case for Medical Justice, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 16, 2004,
http://cgood.org/learn-reading-cgpubs-opeds-26.html.
81. Id. Senate Majority Leader Dr. William Frist has endorsed the concept. See Senator
Bill Frist, Summary of Key Health Policy Proposals, Address to National Press Club (July 12,
2004), http://frist.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Speeches.Detail&Speech-id= 9 7 &
Month=7&Year=2004).
13
Anderson: Effective Legal Reform and the Malpractice Insurance Crisis
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
356
14
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol5/iss1/8
